Navajo Attacks, Surrender and Reservations
Navajos Attack Fort Defiance - Expedition Against Navajos by General Canby - Navajos Ride Roughshod Over Country - General Carleton 's Retort on Conditions - Navajos' Country - Colonel "Kit" Carson's Expedition Against Them - Notified to Surrender by General Carleton - Canyon de Chelly - Stronghold of Navajos - Description of - Campaign in - Surrender of Navajos and Placing Them on Reservation at Bosque Redondo - Number of Navajos - Clash With Mescalero Apaches at Bosque Redondo - Failure of Crops at Bosque Redondo - Miserable Conditions - General Carleton 's Mistaken Policy - General Sherman and Colonel Tappan, Peace Commissioners, Visit Reservation - Establishment of Reservation in Navajo Country and Navajos Removed to It - Prosperity of Navajos in Own Country - Reservation Enlarged - Conditions in 1884 - Navajos Self-supporting and Friendly to Whites.
In the first volume of this work, the expedition against the Navajos down to December 25th, 1858, when the last treaty was made with them, has been recited. There only remains now to give the history of the expeditions under the directions of General Canby and General Carleton by which the tribe was finally subdued.
In 1859, war again broke out, and in 1860, the Navajos attacked Fort
Defiance. Finally General Canby made a long campaign against them, leading
his troops in person. After General Canby's campaign against the Navajos,
when the soldiers were employed to repel the Texas invasion, the Navajos, as
well as the Apaches, rode roughshod over the country. This was in the winter
of 1861 and the spring and summer of 1862. The Navajos and Apaches in 1862,
when General Canby was relieved by General Carleton, were united in war
against the Americans.
General Carleton, in his testimony in 1865 before the Committee on
investigation into Indian affairs, says:
"The Indian difficulties in New Mexico, since the treaty with New Mexico,
have obliged the United States to keep in that territory a force whose
average strength has been at least three thousand men, employees and all
reckoned in. This covers a period of eighteen years. A large proportion of
these troops have been cavalry, the most expensive arm in the military
service, especially in New Mexico, where forage is very expensive. The
horses required as remounts for this cavalry have to be brought across the
plains from the States at great risk and expense. Sometimes large numbers
have been stampeded en route and have never been heard from since. Many die
before they reach this country. Those which arrive here it takes at least a
year to acclimate, and after this the loss of horses by death, by being
broken down, and lost on scouts, and killed in action, and stolen by
Indians, is enormous, compared with losses of cavalry horses in any other
country. The same holds true of mules, more numerous necessarily than
cavalry horses, by reason of the extent of country over which supplies have
to be hauled to subsist and clothe the troops."
In reference to the peonage system, the General says:
"The number of Indians, men, women and children, who have been captured or
bought from the Utes, and who live in the families of the Territory, may be
safely set down as at least three thousand. So far as my observation has
gone, the Mexicans treat them with great kindness. After a while they became
conversant with the language, became attached to the families they live in,
and very seldom care to run away. If they should attempt to run away, I
believe they would be captured by the owners. They are held as servants; as
'hewers of wood and drawers of water. ' These servants do not intermarry
much with the Mexicans, just the women bear children from illicit
intercourse. The offspring of this intercourse are considered peons. The
Indians upon the reservation, if properly cared for by the military
commander, run no risk of being stolen or attacked."
The Navajos inhabited a wide expanse of country, portions of which, by
nature, were almost impregnable to attacking forces. Their complete
subjugation, their removal from their native haunts, and the gathering in of
the tribe so that they could be placed upon a reservation, became an
absolute necessity. With this object in view, General Carleton organized an
expedition against them under Colonel "Kit" Carson.
It was composed of two thousand picked men from the Coloradans and
Californians.
At that time the Navajo reservation was supposed to be very rich in
minerals, and General Carleton suggested in one of his communications to the
Government, that the opening up of this rich mineral country, would more
than reimburse the Government for the expense attending it. In speaking of
the Navajos, he says:
"They have no government to make treaties; they are a patriarchal people.
One set of families may make promises but the other set will not heed them.
They understand the direct application of force as a law; if its application
be removed, that moment they become lawless. This has been tried over and
over again, and at great expense. The purpose now is, never to relax the
application of force with a people that can no more be trusted than the
wolves that run through the mountains. To collect them together, little by
little, on to a reservation, away from the haunts and hills and hiding
places of their country; there to be kind to them; there teach their
children how to read and write; teach them the arts of peace; teach them the
truths of Christianity."
The Navajos were given ample warning of General Carleton's intention. He
personally notified some of the chiefs, and sent messengers to others
informing them that unless before the 20th day of July, 1863, they came in
and surrendered, "after that day every Navajo that is seen will be
considered hostile, and treated accordingly."
A few Navajos accepted the proffered terms and against the others the troops
were kept operating from Forts Stanton, Craig, Canby, Defiance and the post
of Los Pinos. Prowling bands of Navajos appeared in all directions. They
went everywhere in their expeditions. One band of one hundred and thirty
warriors penetrated the Mescalero country, and, passing north, drove off
cattle and sheep from the Bosque Redondo. They were pursued by a few troops
and some Mescaleros, and the property was retaken, with other stolen goods.
Orders were given to the soldiers everywhere to kill every male Navajo
capable of bearing arms, wherever he might be found. Women and children were
to be captured and held as prisoners. These orders were often repeated in
their prosecution. The following, issued to Colonel Rigg, commanding at Fort
Craig, on August 4, 1863, is a sample of the general instructions:
"I have been informed that there is a spring called Ojo de Cibolo, about
fifteen miles west of Limitar, where the Navajos drive their stolen cattle
and ' jerk' the flesh at their leisure. Cannot you make arrangements for a
party of resolute men from your command to be stationed there for say,
thirty days, and kill every Navajo and Apache they can find? A cautious,
wary commander, hiding his men and moving about at night, might kill off a
good many Indians near that point."
These orders were harsh, and, to the refined ear, may seem the very essence
of cruelty and barbarism, but it was the only course to pursue in order to
bring about a permanent peace with the Navajos. Separated in small bands,
they were constantly on the move through a country with which they were
thoroughly acquainted, and in this way they were able to avoid the soldiers
for whom they kept a vigilant watch. After a few weeks of this desultory
fighting, the soldiers were stimulated to a further activity by the offer of
twenty dollars for each good horse turned over to the quartermaster's
department, and one dollar for each sheep.
Colonel Carson's force was the principal one operating against the Navajos,
he having taken the offensive from Fort Canby, but although he was known as
the greatest Indian fighter of his time, his energy and activity never for a
moment being questioned, yet, during the summer of 1863, the results
attained were not important. Carleton consoled the Colonel with the hope
that "As winter approaches you will have better luck." But with the approach
of winter the success of the expedition was not in accordance with the
expectations, so it was decided to attack the Navajos in the Canyon de
Chelly, which was their greatest stronghold. Colonel Carson was ordered to
prepare for this movement, which was to be made in January, 1864. The Canyon
de Chelly was the home of only a small portion of the tribe. There was not
sufficient grass to support the flocks of a larger tribe, but it was a place
remarkable from the fact that it was naturally impregnable. A general
description of this Canyon at that time is to be found in Dunn's "Massacres
of the Mountains," and is as follows:
"The Canyon de Chelly is one of the most remarkable works of nature in the
United States.
The Rio Chelly may be found, not very accurately traced, on any fair sized
map of Arizona in the northeastern corner of that territory. Its headwaters
are in the Sierra Tunicha of Northwestern New Mexico, and it flows thence
almost due west, for some thirty miles, then swings abruptly to the north,
and empties into the Rio San Juan near the northern line of Arizona. The
line of its western flow indicates the position of the Canyon, which extends
throughout that district, the northward bend of the river being just beyond
its mouth. The main canyon is counted as beginning at the union of three
small streams, each of which has a canyon of its own. They are the Cienega
Negra (Black Meadow) or Estrella (Star) on the southeast, the Palo Negro
(Black Timber) or Chelly Creek, on the east, and the Cienega Juanica or
Juanita, on the northwest. The most easterly entrance used by the Indians is
near the head of Chelly Creek; by it, the bottom of that stream is reached
above the junction of the others. It is not accessible for animals. The
Cienega Negra enters it about three miles below the head of the Chelly
proper, and the Juanica half a mile lower. At places above the entrance of
the last named stream the chasm is so narrow that one might almost leap
across it, but the beholder involuntarily recoils from the dizzy view of
over one thousand feet of unbroken descent to the yellow floor beneath.
About half a mile below the Juanica there is another descent, where the wall
of the canyon, there only seven hundred feet high, is broken and
sufficiently sloping to permit a zigzag descent to pack animals. Below this
point the walls increase in height to fifteen hundred feet, and the width of
the canyon from two hundred to three hundred and fifty yards. The next
approach is by a side canyon that enters on the south side, about eleven
miles below the Juanica; it is commonly known as Bat Canyon, but the Indians
and the Mexicans call it Canyon Alsada, or Canyon of the High Rock, from a
natural obelisk, one thousand feet high, with a base of one hundred and
fifty feet, that rises majestically at the mouth of the Canyon, a hundred
feet distant from the wall. This needle leans so much that it seems about to
topple over. The Alsada entrance is the one commonly used in approaching
from Fort Defiance, and the trail is cut deep in the sandstone by thousands
of feet of men and animals that in past generations have followed it. The
descent here is along ledges on the canyon wall, so narrow that animals are
always driven ahead, for fear they may slip and carry the owner over.
Occasionally, below this point, there are lateral openings in the canyon
walls, but none of them extends more than a few hundred yards back, and
there is no other entrance until about three miles above the mouth where the
Canyon del Trigo (Wheat Canyon), enters from the north. Below the Trigo, the
walls sink rapidly, and the canyon opens out into a rolling country, barren
and unprepossessing." Colonel Carson started from Fort Canby on January 6,
1864, with a force of three hundred and ninety officers and men for the
mouth of the Canyon. Before starting, he sent Captain Pfeiffer, with one
company, to operate from the eastern end. His command was three days
marching from Fort Canby to the Pueblo Colorado on account of snow, a
distance usually accomplished in one day. The supply train, which started on
the 3rd, had taken five days to make this distance of twenty-five miles, and
had lost twenty-seven oxen. He left a part of the train at the Pueblo
Colorado, and pushed on to the Canyon, which he reached on the 12th, about
six miles above the mouth. On the night of the 11th, Sergeant Andres
Herrara, with fifty men, was sent out upon a scouting expedition. The
following morning, this party found a fresh trail, and, following it
rapidly, overtook the Indians just as they were entering the Canyon. They
killed eleven, captured two women and two children, with one hundred and
thirty sheep and goats. On the 13th, Carson divided his force into two
commands, one, under Captain Barney, was sent up the north side of the
canyon, and the other, under Captain Carey, accompanied by Carson himself,
moved up the south side with a view to ascertaining the topography of the
country, and the position of the Navajo if they had undertaken to make a
stand. The latter party captured five wounded Indians at the scene of
Herrara's fight. On the 14th they returned to the mouth of the canyon and
found Pfeiffer there he having marched successfully through the canyon
without any casualty to his command. He had killed three Indians and brought
in nineteen women and children.
Three Indians, under a flag of truce, entered Carson's camp and asked if
they might come in with their families and surrender. They were told that
they could provided they came in before ten o'clock the next morning, but
not later. About sixty came in by the appointed time and acceded to the
terms of surrender and removal to the Bosque. Carson says: "They declared
that, owing to the operations of my command, they are in a complete state of
starvation, and that many of their women and children have already died from
this cause. They also stated that they would have come in long ago, but that
they believed it was a war of extermination, and that they were equally
surprised and delighted to learn the contrary from an old captive whom I had
sent back to them for the purpose. I issued them some meat, and as they
asked permission to return to their haunts and collect the remainder of
their people, I directed them to meet me at this post (Fort Canby) in ten
days. They have all arrived here according to promise, and many of them,
with others, joining and travelling in with Captain Carey's command. This
command of seventy-five men I conferred upon Captain Carey at his own
request, he being desirous of passing through this stupendous canyon. I sent
the party to return through the Canyon from west to east, that all the peach
orchards, of which there are many, might be destroyed, as well as the
dwellings of the Indians." About three thousand peach trees were destroyed
in the canyon; and one hundred and ten Navajos came in with Carey's command.
On January 23rd, Colonel Carson reported the results of the expedition as
follows: "Killed 23; captured 34; voluntarily surrendered 200; captured 200
head of sheep."
In his report of January 23rd, 1864, of this expedition Carson says:
"But it is to the ulterior effects of the expedition that I look for the
greatest results. We have shown the Indians that in no place, however
formidable or inaccessible in their opinion, are they safe from the pursuit
of the troops of this command, and have convinced a large portion of them
that the struggle on their part is a hopeless one. We have also demonstrated
that the intentions of the government towards them are eminently humane, and
dictated by an earnest desire to promote their welfare; that the principle
is not to destroy but to save them, if they are disposed to be saved. When
all this is understood by the Navajos, generally, as it soon will be, and
when they become convinced that destruction will follow on resistance, they
will gladly avail themselves of the opportunities afforded them of peace and
plenty under the fostering care of the government, as do all those now with
whom I have had any means of communicating. They are arriving almost hourly,
and will, I believe, continue to arrive until the last Indian in this
section of the country is en route to the Bosque Redondo."
Carson's prediction was verified by subsequent events. The Navajos
surrendered so fast that General Carleton's resources were taxed to the
utmost to support them. By February 20th, seven hundred and fifty had
surrendered at Los Pinos, and been forwarded to the Bosque. On February
24th, sixteen hundred and fifty surrendered at Fort Canby, and on the same
date thirteen hundred more were reported from Los Pinos. By March 11th
fifteen hundred more had come in at Fort Canby, and General Carleton
notified Carson that he could not take care of more than one additional
thousand. By July 8th there were six thousand three hundred and twenty-one
at the Bosque, and a thousand more at Fort Canby. The war was evidently
ended; Fort Canby was ordered abandoned in August and the troops were sent
into Arizona.
The number of Navajos had been underestimated by General Carleton. Carson
maintained that there were at least twelve thousand, and, according to
subsequent statistics, he was right, but Carleton insisted that there were
not more than eight thousand. The greatest number ever at the Bosque Redondo
was between nine and ten thousand. The remainder of the nation lurked in
their old haunts or fell back to the desert regions of Arizona and Utah to
avoid the troops. New Mexico offered to relieve the Government of a portion
of the heavy expense of caring for the exiled Navajos by a system of binding
out, but the offer was declined and the Navajos were all sent to the Bosque
where, at that time, were also gathered a number of Mescalero Apaches. These
two tribes had been enemies; their customs differed; the Mescaleros were
bolder warriors, but were far inferior in numbers. Tribal jealousies were
aggravated by petty aggressions and hectoring. The Apaches accused the
Navajos of trampling down their crops, and otherwise annoying them. The
reservation authorities made the matter worse by removing the Mescaleros
from the land they had been cultivating, and giving it to the Navajos. The
Mescaleros then claimed the fulfillment of the promise to them of a
reservation in their own country, and when this was refused, they went
without permission, and began hostilities. The fitness of the Bosque Redondo
for these Indians has been a subject of great controversy.
"Agriculture at the Bosque did not result successfully; the crops usually
promised well enough, but something always spoiled them. One time it was
drought, another cut worms, another bad irrigation or overflows, or hail
storms. The Indians were, of necessity, a great expense to the government.
The cost of feeding them for seven months, March to September, inclusive, in
1865, was $452,356.98. The cost for the year previous to this time averaged
higher than this, but the exact figures cannot be given, on account of the
large amount of stores transferred from other departments and not reported
as to value. All this time it was well known that they could support
themselves in their own country. The principal cause of their helplessness
in their new home was that they were a pastoral, not an agricultural people.
In their own country their chief food is goats' milk and the roots of
certain herbs of wild growth. Their flocks had been largely destroyed during
the war. Tradition puts the number of sheep killed by soldiers at fifty
thousand, but the Navajos say that the Utes and Mexicans stole the greater
part of them. The Bosque did not afford grazing facilities for the sheep and
goats they still had, and these gradually decreased in number. It has been
proven since then that they can and will take care of themselves, very
easily, if they can get ample pasturage; and unless stock raising is to be
considered a less civilized pursuit than agriculture, there is no reason why
any forcible attempt should be made to change the natural bent of their
industrial instincts.
"The head of the opposition to the Bosque was Dr. Matthew Steck, a well
known settler in New Mexico, at that time Superintendent of Indian Affairs.
He favored giving the Mescaleros a reservation in their own country, as had
been promised them, and opposed the removal of the Navajos to the Bosque. He
advocated his views in New Mexico, and when he found he could do nothing
there, he went to Washington to secure the same ends. Carleton complained
bitterly of this attempted interference with his plans, and insisted upon
the enforcement of the ultra-human policy; that is, on compelling the
Indians to do what the white man in authority - in this case himself - may
think to be best for them. He said: 'Dr. Steck wants to hold councils with
the Navajos! It is mockery to hold councils with a people who are in our
hands, and have only to await our decision. It will be bad policy to hold
any councils. We should give them what they need, what is just, and take
care of them as children until they can take care of themselves. The Navajos
should never leave the Bosque, and never shall if I can prevent it. I told
them that that should be their home. They have gone there with that
understanding. There is land enough there for themselves and the Apaches.
The Navajos themselves are Apaches, and talk the same language, and in a few
years will be homogeneous with them. "He was proven to be mistaken as to the
two tribes becoming homogeneous; whether he was wrong in other respects is a
question about which people will differ; in brief, it is simply the question
whether the concentration policy is the right one - whether it is better to
place Indians where they do not wish to be, oblige them to do things which
they do not wish to do, and force them to abandon the pursuits by which they
had formerly supported themselves. General Carleton also accused Mr. Steck
of acting from interested motives, but he did not specify in what regard.
"In the winter of 1864-65, the Navajos at the Bosque were reduced to
terrible straits through the destruction of their crops by cut worms. There
was want all through that portion of the country from various causes.
Neither the War nor the Indian Department was able to relieve them
adequately. There was no relief from natural sources, for the acorns, cedar
berries, wild potatoes, palmillas and other roots, mescal and mesquite, on
which they could rely in their old home in times of famine, were not found
in the Bosque. Cattle and sheep were issued to them for food, 'head and
pluck' and the blood of the slaughtered animals was ordered to be saved to
make 'haggis and blood puddings' for the orphan children. To add to their
distress, these people, who make the most serviceable blankets in the world
and usually have plenty of them, were destitute, by the ravages of their
enemies, of both blankets and clothing. They had no houses, and, as
substitutes, holes were ordered to be dug, in which they might be sheltered
from the wind. In spite of all his efforts and ingenuity, General Carleton
knew that they must suffer, and, on October 31, 1864, he directed the
commandant at Fort Sumner to explain his good intentions to the Indians.
'Tell them,' he said, 'to be too proud to murmur at what cannot be helped.
We could not foresee the total destruction of their corn crop, nor could we
foresee that the frost and hail would come and destroy the crop in the
country; but not to be discouraged; to work hard, every man and woman, to
put in large fields next year, when, if God smiles upon our efforts, they
will, at one bound, be forever placed beyond want, and be independent. Tell
them not to believe ever that we are not their best friends; that their
enemies have told them that we would destroy them; that we had sent big guns
there to attack them; that those guns were only to be used against their
enemies if they continue to behave as they have done. '
"With all his good intentions, General Carleton was inexcusable, under
analogy of the laws that are daily administered in every state and territory
of the Union. There is no excuse known for the failure under such
circumstances. When a man is restrained of his liberty, or deprived of any
right, for the purpose of benefiting him, there is no extenuation except he
be in fact benefited, or, at least, not injured. Good intentions never
excuse a wrong; and though, as a war measure, placing the Navajos at the
Bosque may be justified, keeping them there against their will, in time of
peace, is clearly an infringement of natural right. Our Government must
actually benefit the Indians by the reservation system in order to justify
itself. Still, General Carleton stuck to his theory, and said that if the
Navajos were moved from the Bosque at all, they ought to be sent to Kansas
or the Indian Territory. In 1865 the worms destroyed the crops again, and,
on July 18, after giving directions for husbanding all food, Carleton
instructed the officer in command: 'You should tell the Indians what a
dreadful year it is, and how they must save everything to eat which lies in
their power, or starvation will come upon them.' The Indians had been
slipping away from the place in small parties since midwinter of 1864-65,
and in July a large party, under Ganado Blanco (White Cattle) broke away
forcibly, but they were pursued and driven back. In August Carleton
concluded to let the few Coyotero Apaches on the reservation return to their
own country, as they desired. In the summer of this year a commission,
consisting of Senator Doolittle, Vice President Foster and Representative
Ross, visited New Mexico, and made a full investigation of the Indian
affairs there, but nothing resulted from it.
"In 1865 Felipe Delgado succeeded Mr. Steck as Superintendent; he was in
harmony with General Carleton, and reported that, 'It is fair to presume
that next year their (the Navajos) facilities will be greater,' etc. He had
the good sense to recommend the purchase of sheep for them. In 1866 the
crops failed again - this time, as Superintendent A. B. Norton, and their
agent reported, from bad seed, improper management, and overflows of the
Pecos. There were reported to be 7000 Indians on the reservation, and the
cost of keeping them was estimated at $1,500,000 annually. In 1867 the crops
failed, from bad management and hail storms, as reported; the Comanches
attacked and robbed the Navajos several times; and many of their horses died
from eating poisonous weeds. There were 7300 Indians reported as on the
reservation, and their property had become reduced to 550 horses, 20 mules,
940 sheep, and 1025 goats. In 1868 Superintendent Davis reported: 'The
Navajos were located several years ago upon a reservation at the Bosque
Redondo by the military, and after expending vast sums of money, and after
making every effort for more than four years to make it a success, it has
proved a total failure. It was certainly a very unfortunate selection for a
reserve; no wood, unproductive soil, and very unhealthy water, and the
Indians were so much dissatisfied they planted no grain last spring, and I
verily believe they were making preparations to leave as the Apaches did.'
"Fortunately for all concerned, General Sherman and Colonel Tappan, Peace
Commissioners, reached New Mexico in May, 1868. They satisfied themselves
that the Navajos would never become self-supporting or contented at the
Bosque Redondo, and, on June 1, entered into an agreement with the tribe by
which they were to be removed to their former country. The reservation then
given them was included between parallel 37° of north latitude, and a
parallel drawn through Fort Defiance, for north and south line, and parallel
of longitude 109° 30', and a parallel drawn through Ojo del Oso, as east and
west lines. The Indians were to receive five dollars annually, in clothing,
for each member of the tribe, and ten dollars for each one engaged in
farming or mechanical pursuits. Each head of a family was entitled to select
one hundred and sixty acres of land, if he desired to hold in severalty, and
in such case he was to receive one hundred dollars in seeds and implements
the first year, and twenty-five dollars for each the second and third years.
Buildings of the value of $11,500 were to be erected, and the Navajos
pledged themselves to compel all their children between the ages of six and
sixteen to attend school. A separate schoolhouse and teacher was to be
provided for every thirty pupils; $150,000 was to be appropriated at once to
the Indians, part of which was to be expended in the purchase of 15,000
sheep and goats and 500 cattle, and the remainder to be used for the
expenses of their removal, and in such other ways as should appear most
beneficial.
"Under this liberal treaty the tribe was removed in 1868, and since then
there has been a continuous improvement in their condition. They had very
bad luck with their crops for several years, but their herds increased
steadily. By 1873, they were reported to have 10,000 horses and 200,000
sheep and goats. In 1872 an Indian police force was organized at the agency,
on recommendation of Captain Bennett, and placed under control of Manuelito,
their war chief, providing, for the first time in their history, for a
control of offenders by tribal authority. It was discontinued in 1873 for a
short time, but was soon put in force again, with beneficial results. A few
years later the Indians abandoned it on account of the small pay given to
the policemen. About fifteen men are now employed, and they appear to be all
that are needed. In 1876 the Navajos were reported as self-supporting,
notwithstanding they had lost 40,000 sheep by freezing during the past
winter. In 1878 their agent said: 'Within the ten years during which the
present treaty with the Navajos had been in force, they have grown from a
band of paupers to a nation of prosperous, industrious, shrewd and (for
barbarians) intelligent people.' They were reported at that time as
numbering 11,800, and owning 20,000 horses, 1500 cattle, and 500,000 sheep;
they were tilling 9192 acres of land, and obtained ninety-five per cent of
their subsistence from civilized pursuits. "In fact they were increasing so
rapidly that there was an urgent call for more room, and, as there was
desert land to spare in all directions, it was given to them. By executive
order of October 29, 1878, there was added to their reservation the land
between the northern line of Arizona parallel 110° of west longitude,
parallel 36° of north latitude, and the western line of the reservation.
Still there was a call for more land, and on January 6, 1880, they were
given a strip fifteen miles wide along the eastern side of the reservation,
and one six miles wide along the southern line. In the latter year, three
windmill pumps and fifty-two stock pumps were put in at different points on
the reservation, which have stopped much of their wandering in search of
water, and added greatly to the value of their grazing lands. Their march of
improvement has not stopped, and in 1881 the nation, estimated at 17,000,
cultivated 15,000 acres of land, and raised 220,000 bushels of corn and
21,000 bushels of wheat; they had 35,000 horses and 1,000,000 sheep. In 1884
the reservation was extended west to 111 30', and the northern boundary was
made the Colorado and San Juan Rivers. By this addition, the reservation
enclosed the Moqui Pueblo Reservation on two sides, and the agencies for the
two have been consolidated. This order, increasing the reservation by
1,769,600 acres in Arizona and Utah, was supplemented by one taking away
46,000 acres in New Mexico; the reservation as now established includes
8,159,360 acres, mostly desert land."
The foregoing is taken from Dunn's "Massacres of the Mountains," published
in 1886.
The Navajos, from the time they were restored to their old camping grounds,
were never afterwards hostile to the whites, but were self-supporting in
every particular.
Notes About Book:
Source: History Of Arizona Volume 2, By Thomas Edwin Farish, 1915, Printed
and Published by Direction of the Second Legislature of the State of
Arizona, A. D.
Notes about Online Publication: This manuscript has been ocr'd and heavily
edited. Many of the Native American words have been reproduced as clearly as
online publication will allow us, but not all are exactly the way they were
in the original work. The structure of this manuscript has been changed to
allow better online presentation.
